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A B S T R A C T
Humans owe their ecological success to their great capacities for social learning and cooperation: learning from
others helps individuals adjust to their environment and can promote cooperation in groups. Classic and recent
studies indicate that the cultural organization of societies shapes the inﬂuence of social information on decision
making and suggest that collectivist values (prioritizing the group relative to the individual) increase tendencies
to conform to the majority. However, it is unknown whether and how societal background impacts social
learning in cooperative interactions. Here we show that social learning in cooperative decision making sys-
tematically varies across two societies. We experimentally compare people's basic propensities for social learning
in samples from a collectivist (China) and an individualist society (United Kingdom; total n=540) in a social
dilemma and a coordination game. We demonstrate that Chinese participants base their cooperation decisions on
information about their peers much more frequently than their British counterparts. Moreover, our results reveal
remarkable societal diﬀerences in the type of peer information people consider. In contrast to the consensus
view, Chinese participants tend to be substantially less majority-oriented than the British. While Chinese par-
ticipants are inclined to adopt peer behavior that leads to higher payoﬀs, British participants tend to cooperate
only if suﬃciently many peers do so too. These results indicate that the basic processes underlying social
transmission are not universal; rather, they vary with cultural conditions. As success-based learning is associated
with selﬁsh behavior and majority-based learning can help foster cooperation, our study suggests that in dif-
ferent societies social learning can play diverging roles in the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.
1. Introduction
The adaptability of humans largely depends on their social nature
(Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Henrich, 2015). Many people are
inclined to cooperate with others and coordinate their actions in
groups, allowing them to overcome challenges that would be im-
possible to tackle alone. The willingness to help others at one's own
expense promotes mutually beneﬁcial outcomes and underlies the
smooth functioning of societies (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). Human co-
operativeness is complemented and facilitated by a great capacity for
social learning, that is, adjusting behavior through observing and in-
teracting with others (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Tomasello, 2009). Social
learning enables individuals to adapt to new social and environmental
conditions and allows useful knowledge to accumulate in human po-
pulations and be transmitted across generations, forming the basis of
human culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman,
1981; Derex & Boyd, 2016; Henrich, 2015; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013;
Mesoudi, 2011a; Tomasello, 2009).
Theory suggests that individuals should decide strategically from
whom to learn (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Kendal, Giraldeau, &
Laland, 2009; Laland, 2004; Rendell et al., 2010). Two prominent
strategies are payoﬀ-based learning (Schlag, 1998), in which people
imitate successful peers, and majority-based learning (Boyd &
Richerson, 1985), where people tend to conform to locally common
behavior. These social learning strategies can have profound con-
sequences for the dynamics of cooperation in groups (Boyd &
Richerson, 1985; Burton-Chellew, El Mouden, & West, 2017; Burton-
Chellew, Nax, & West, 2015; Lehmann & Feldman, 2008; Lehmann,
Feldman, & Foster, 2008; Molleman, Pen, & Weissing, 2013; Molleman,
Quiñones, & Weissing, 2013; van den Berg, Molleman, & Weissing,
2015). When individuals in a group mutually beneﬁt from coordinating
their behavior, the relative frequencies of payoﬀ-based and majority-
based social learning can aﬀect the outcome of social interactions and
change the stability of equilibria by altering their basins of attraction
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(Molleman, Pen, et al., 2013; Pena, Volken, Pestelacci, & Tomassini,
2009; Skyrms, 2005). Moreover, when individual and group interests
are at odds with each other (e.g., in a social dilemma), payoﬀ-based
social learning typically undermines cooperation within groups because
defectors tend to achieve higher payoﬀs than cooperators (Burton-
Chellew et al., 2015; van den Berg et al., 2015). By contrast, majority-
based social learning can help support cooperation when individuals
cooperate as long as their interaction partners do so as well (Boyd &
Richerson, 1985, 2010). An inﬂuential strand of theory holds that when
individuals conform to local majorities, stable between-group diﬀer-
ences can emerge, fueling a process of ‘cultural group selection’ where
internally cooperative groups outcompete less cooperative groups, ul-
timately leading to the spread of cooperation on a large scale (Boyd,
Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 2010; Henrich,
2004; Richerson et al., 2016).
Despite the widely acknowledged importance of social learning
strategies in human adaptation and cooperation, experimental evidence
on the determinants of these strategies is currently lacking (Mesoudi,
Chang, Dall, & Thornton, 2016). We use a large-scale decision-making
experiment (n=540) to study how the cultural organization of a so-
ciety (Greif, 1994) shapes social learning in cooperative decision
making. We focus on ‘collectivism–individualism’, a society-wide set of
values that govern the role of the individual relative to the group (Greif,
1994; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991;
Schwartz, 1994). Collectivist and individualist values have been shown
to mold human cognition and social behavior in a range of domains
such as thinking styles (Nisbett, 2010), everyday dishonesty (Gächter &
Schulz, 2016), and the inclination to trust others (Yamagishi, Cook, &
Watabe, 1998).
The central role of the group in collectivist societies plausibly
modulates the relevance of social information in people's everyday in-
teractions. In collectivist societies, people tend to see themselves pri-
marily as part of a collective; they tend to value ﬁtting-in and harmony
and to derive their own identity from their relationships with others. By
contrast, people from individualist societies are inclined to see them-
selves as independent, to emphasize uniqueness and autonomy, and to
regard others as points of social comparison (Markus & Kitayama,
1991). More than individualist societies, collectivist societies empha-
size conformist values in upbringing, schooling, and daily life (relying
on rote learning and valuing obedience to parents and teachers;
Mesoudi, Chang, Murray, & Lu, 2015; Schwartz, 1994). Psychological
studies indicate that people from collectivist societies are more likely
than people from individualist societies to conform to majority beha-
vior among their peers (Bond & Smith, 1996). Moreover, recent beha-
vioral experiments suggest that collectivist values may enhance in-
dividuals' reliance on social learning in solving complex individual
tasks (Glowacki & Molleman, 2017; Mesoudi et al., 2015; Toelch, Bruce,
Newson, Richerson, & Reader, 2014). Based on these observations, we
predict that people from collectivist societies rely more on social in-
formation in cooperative interactions, and are more inclined to follow
majority behavior than people from individualist societies.
We use a behavioral experiment to assess basic propensities for
Fig. 1. Summary of the experimental setup. (a, b, c) Payoﬀ structure of the three interaction settings. (a) Social dilemma: option A (‘cooperate’) increases the average
payoﬀs of either option for all group members, while option B (‘defect’) is individually optimal. (b) Coordination game: option B has higher expected payoﬀs than
option A when all group members choose it, but expected payoﬀs of either option increase with the number of group members choosing it. (c) Best choice setting:
expected payoﬀs are independent of other group members, and one of the options leads to higher payoﬀs than the other. Panels show the deterministic part of the
payoﬀs; actual payoﬀs were noisy (Section 2.5). (d, e) Stylized screenshots of the two key experimental screens. In each period of a block (after the ﬁrst, where no
social information was available yet), participants could choose (‘yes’ or ‘no’) to pay two points to collect information. If they chose ‘yes’, they were directed to the
screen shown in (d), which allowed them to collect information about the previous decision and previous payoﬀs of each of their four peers. Participants could select
up to four pieces of information by clicking on the boxes. Boxes could be deselected, but the number of selected boxes could never exceed four. The screen in panel (e)
subsequently revealed the selected information, and participants made their choice at the bottom. Both screens in (d, e) are stylized for explanatory purposes; in the
real experiment participants chose between planting diﬀerent crops on a virtual farm (Supplementary materials). (f) The overall structure of a session, based on the
design of Molleman et al. (2014) and van den Berg et al. (2015). Each square represents a block of ﬁve periods in which participants made binary decisions in groups
of ﬁve. In between these blocks, new groups were randomly formed. Sessions started with an unincentivized test stage to make participants familiar with the decision-
making environment. The incentivized part of sessions started with a ‘best choice’ setting (the simplest setting, as payoﬀs did not depend on the decisions of others).
The order of the subsequent social dilemma and coordination game was randomized between sessions. Sessions concluded with a questionnaire with demographic
items, as well as items related to interdependence and attitudes towards conformity (Figs. S1 and S2).
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social learning in cooperative decision making across two very diﬀerent
societies, China and the United Kingdom. We ask to what extent people
from a collectivist (China) and an individualist (United Kingdom) so-
ciety use social information in making cooperative decisions, and
whether they use payoﬀ-based or majority-based social learning stra-
tegies. Native Chinese (in Ningbo and Shanghai, n=320) and native
British participants (in Norwich and Nottingham, n=220) completed a
series of tasks (Molleman, van den Berg, & Weissing, 2014; van den
Berg et al., 2015) in which they interacted anonymously via web
browsers. Participants were placed in groups of ﬁve to make a series of
simultaneous binary decisions. If societal background matters, we ex-
pect similar behavior within a country, but diﬀerences between coun-
tries.
Participants faced three interaction settings in sequence (Fig. 1): a
social dilemma, a coordination game, and a ‘best choice’ setting. In the
social dilemma, one option (‘cooperate’) increased the average payoﬀs of
all group members, while the other option (‘defect’) improved one's
own payoﬀs in a given period. In the coordination game, the expected
payoﬀs of either option increased with the number of group members
choosing it. In case all group members coordinated on the same option,
one option had higher expected payoﬀs than the other option (that is,
the two pure strategy equilibria have diﬀerent expected payoﬀs). In the
best choice setting, one option was associated with higher expected
payoﬀs than the other option, and payoﬀs did not depend on the
choices of other group members. In each interaction setting participants
were informed of the general payoﬀ structure, but actual payoﬀs were
noisy, making social information a potentially valuable source of in-
formation for decision making (Methods).
Our best choice setting reﬂects an individual decision-making si-
tuation, as payoﬀs of behavior are independent of the behavior of
others. Interaction settings like these have been studied in experimental
work on human social learning (e.g., Eﬀerson et al., 2007; McElreath
et al., 2005, 2008; Mesoudi, 2008, 2011b; Toelch et al., 2014). In such
situations, social information is mainly useful for improving one's es-
timates of the payoﬀs of behavioral alternatives in a noisy or complex
environment. Accordingly, when given the choice between various so-
cial learning strategies, people tend to use payoﬀ-based social learning
(Mesoudi, 2011b). Although these ﬁndings give valuable insights into
the mechanisms of social transmission and help explain the spread of
technological innovations, they have limited relevance to cooperative
settings, where payoﬀs of behavior depend on both the external en-
vironment and the behavior of others. This is why the social dilemma
and the coordination game take center stage in our paper. In such
settings, it becomes important to track the distribution of the behavioral
tendencies of one's interaction partners. Experimental evidence sug-
gests that in cooperation settings, many people indeed tend to rely on
information about majority behavior rather than information about
their peers' payoﬀs (Molleman et al., 2014).
In our experiment, we measure basic aspects of each participant's
social learning strategy by having them choose whether or not to re-
quest information about their peers before making their own decisions.
Choosing to request social information comes at a small cost, and allows
participants to obtain up to four units of social information before
making a decision. Each unit reveals the previous decision or the pre-
vious payoﬀ of another group member. We characterize each in-
dividual's social learning strategy based on two measures: their request
rate for social information (i.e., their reliance on social learning) and,
conditional upon requesting social information, the fraction of requests
including payoﬀ information (i.e., their orientation towards payoﬀs or
the majority). To assess the eﬀect of societal background on social
learning in cooperative decision making, we focus on variation within
and between countries with respect to individuals' reliance on social
learning and orientation towards payoﬀs or the majority. If societal
background matters, we predict high between-country and low within-
country variation in social information requests.
2. Methods
2.1. Rationale
Our research strategy was to conduct our experiment using parti-
cipant pools from the United Kingdom and China, countries on opposite
ends of sociological axes of individualism–collectivism (the United
Kingdom ranks 3rd and China ranks 58th out of 76 countries listed in a
widely used ‘individualism index’ (Hofstede et al., 2010), with scores of
89 and 20 out of 100, respectively). We followed the standards of cross-
cultural experimentation, varying our variable of interest (i.e., col-
lectivism) while aiming to minimize other potentially confounding
factors as much as possible (Gächter & Schulz, 2016; Herrmann, Thöni,
& Gächter, 2008; Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, & Zamir, 1991; for
further discussion, see Experimental Procedures in the Supplementary
Information). To check whether collectivist values varied across sam-
ples in the expected way, we measured two of its key aspects with post-
experimental questionnaire items. First, we used established survey
items to measure orientations towards conformity and compliance
(Schwartz, 1994). Compared to British participants, the Chinese re-
ported a stronger orientation towards conformity (two-sided t-test:
t=11.645, d.f. 370.5, p < 0.001; Fig. S1). Second, as a proxy of in-
terdependence we used the ‘Inclusion of the Other in the Self’ scale
(Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Gächter, Starmer, & Tufano, 2015), re-
ﬂecting the closeness that individuals perceive in their relationships to
the other participants in their session. Again, the data conﬁrm that
participants in our Chinese sample have stronger collectivist orienta-
tions, reporting signiﬁcantly higher perceptions of interdependence
than the British participants (two-sided t-test: t=2.392, d.f. = 445.11,
p=0.017; Fig. S2).
2.2. Participants
A total of 540 participants (mostly students; 56% female; mean age
21.1 years, SD 2.9; see Supplementary Experimental Procedures for
demographic details) took part in 24 experimental sessions (China:
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, nine sessions, n=180; University of
Nottingham Ningbo Campus, ﬁve sessions, n=140; United Kingdom:
University of East Anglia Norwich, ﬁve sessions, n=75; University of
Nottingham, ﬁve sessions, n=145). Participation was restricted to
Chinese and British nationals respectively. There were no further par-
ticipation restrictions. Participants came from diverse regions within
both countries. Informed consent was obtained from all participants
before starting the experiment.
2.3. Procedure
Experiments took place in computer laboratories at the four uni-
versities between January and April 2015. In each session, 10–30 par-
ticipants participated and received monetary rewards depending on
their performance in the experiment, which in turn depended on their
decisions (see Section 2.5). At the start of a session, participants re-
ceived written general instructions in their own language (sessions in
Shanghai and Ningbo: Chinese; Nottingham and Norwich: English),
which were also read out loud by a local native speaker (English version
in Supplementary Experimental Procedures). During the session parti-
cipants earned points, the total sum of which was converted into cash at
the end of the experiment (in China, 20 points earned 1RMB; in the
United Kingdom, 150 points earned 1GBP). Following established
standards of conducting cross-cultural economics experiments
(Herrmann et al., 2008; Roth et al., 1991), stake sizes were adjusted for
local purchasing power. Participants earned 2120 points on average
(range: 1286 to 2913), and sessions lasted for about 90min. We used
the experimental software LIONESS (Arechar, Gächter, & Molleman,
2018) to conduct the experiments. For further discussion of our ex-
perimental implementation, see Supplementary Experimental
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Procedures.
2.4. Interaction settings
Participants were allocated to groups of ﬁve and repeatedly inter-
acted anonymously via web browsers. Participants faced a total of three
interaction settings (a ‘best choice’ setting where payoﬀs were in-
dependent of the actions of peers, a social dilemma and a coordination
game; see Section 2.5 for details). Sessions always started with a test
stage in which participants could get used to the decision-making en-
vironment, followed by the best choice setting (the simplest setting);
the order of the social dilemma and the coordination game was coun-
terbalanced between sessions. In each setting, participants received on-
screen instructions particular to the upcoming setting before interac-
tions began. The instructions outlined the general structure of the in-
teractions but did not show any speciﬁc details on expected payoﬀs (see
Supplementary Information, Sections 3 and 4 for instructions given on
paper and on-screen). Fig. 1 summarizes the experimental setup.
Decision making was framed as choosing to produce one of two
crops on a virtual farm. This framing has been commonly used to study
social learning in human decision making (McElreath et al., 2005,
2008; Molleman et al., 2014; Toelch et al., 2014; van den Berg et al.,
2015). We used real crop names but for simplicity we will here refer to
crops A and B. In each period (‘season’), all farmers in a group made
their decisions simultaneously. All produced crops were sold on the
‘market’, after which each player saw the payoﬀs resulting from their
own choice. Each interaction setting lasted for 20 periods in total,
subdivided in four blocks of ﬁve. After each block, new groups were
randomly formed and participants were presented with a fresh pair of
crops to choose from. Regrouping confronted participants with new
social circumstances in which gathering information about peers could
be helpful in decision making.
2.5. Parameters
Each of the three interaction settings was characterized by a payoﬀ
matrix ⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
a b
c d . Payoﬀs of choosing A and B were
πA= p ∙ a+(1− p) ∙ b+ ε and πB= p ∙ c+(1− p) ∙ d+ ε, respectively,
where p denotes the fraction of participants in the group who chose
option A. The ε reﬂects a stochastic ‘noise’ component (see below). For
the social dilemma, we chose parameters a=40, b=−20, c=60,
d=0; in a given round, option B (‘defect’) yielded higher expected
payoﬀs to an individual, but average payoﬀs increased with the number
of group members choosing A (Fig. 1a). For the coordination game we
chose a=30, b=−50, c=−50, d=70; for both options, expected
payoﬀs increased with the number of group members choosing it. Op-
tion B had a larger basin of attraction, and if all group members chose
the same option, B yielded higher expected payoﬀs than A (Fig. 1b).
Finally, for the best choice setting, we chose parameters a=30, b=30,
c=10, d=10, respectively; payoﬀs for A and B were independent of
the choices of other group members (Fig. 1c). On the participants' de-
cision screens (Fig. 1e) the relative positions (left or right) of the crops
corresponding to A and B were randomized between blocks of the best
choice setting and the coordination game. This ensured that the posi-
tion (left or right) of the option with the higher expected value (or the
larger basin of attraction) could vary between rounds. In the social
dilemma, the positions of A (‘cooperate’) and B (‘defect’) did not change
across blocks.
For each participant in each period, the noise term ε was in-
dependently drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 20. This level of noise implies that in each in-
teraction setting, at p=0.5, choosing the individually inferior option
nevertheless leads to higher payoﬀs in 24% of the cases. Noise reﬂects
the fact that outcomes of behavior are often inﬂuenced by exogenous
factors. Moreover, noise made it harder for the subjects to ﬁnd out
individually the relative payoﬀ of the choice options, thereby in-
creasing the potential usefulness of social information.
2.6. Measures of social learning strategies
Before making their decisions, participants were given the oppor-
tunity to collect information about their fellow group members. To
make participants actively consider whether or not they would want to
use social information, we imposed a cost of two points for choosing to
collect it. For each of the four peers in a group, two pieces of in-
formation were available: their previous decision and the previous
payoﬀ associated with that decision (Fig. 1d), resulting in a total of
eight pieces of information to choose from. Participants could select
these pieces of information at will, but the number of pieces that could
be collected was limited to four; participants had to be selective with
regard to the information they wanted to base their decisions on. We
characterize the social learning strategy of each participant with regard
to (i) frequency of requests (i.e., the fraction of periods in which they
decided to collect social information, reﬂecting their reliance on social
learning) and (ii) the fraction of those requests that included informa-
tion about peer payoﬀs (i.e., the total number of requests for a peer's
payoﬀs divided by the total number of peers consulted, reﬂecting their
orientation towards payoﬀs vs. the majority). All statistical analyses
were conducted in R v.3.1.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
3. Results
In each of the interaction settings, aggregate behavioral dynamics
accorded with the underlying payoﬀ structures, with most groups ap-
proaching the Nash equilibria over time (social dilemma: defection;
coordination game: either of the two pure-strategy equilibria; best
choice setting: choosing the high-payoﬀ option; Figs. S3, S4, S5). In this
section we present the key measures of individuals' social learning. We
focus on patterns of variation between countries and between cities
within countries, comparing social learning strategies in cooperative
decision making in the social dilemma and the coordination game. We
also present the results of the best choice setting.
3.1. Societal background shapes social learning strategies
Request rates for social information strongly diﬀer between China
and the United Kingdom (Fig. 2a, b, c). In the social dilemma, Chinese
participants request social information much more frequently than
British participants (Fig. 2a; mean request rates: China 0.551, United
Kingdom 0.386). Non-parametric tests comparing the distributions of
individuals' request rates reveal highly signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the two countries (Mann-Whitney (MW) test with the n=540 in-
dividual request rates as independent observations: p < 0.001) and
detect no diﬀerences between cities in either country (see Table S1 for
an overview of test statistics and eﬀect sizes).
We observe similar patterns in the coordination game, where Chinese
participants once again request social information more frequently than
their British counterparts (Fig. 2b; Table S1; MW test: p=0.005). As in
the social dilemma, diﬀerences between countries are much larger than
the diﬀerences between cities within countries. Similar results are ob-
served for the ‘non-cooperative’ best choice setting, where Chinese par-
ticipants also request social information more frequently than their
British counterparts (Fig. 2c; Table S1; MW test: p < 0.001). The non-
parametric test results are conﬁrmed by more ﬁne-grained analyses
based on logistic generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) ﬁtted to
individual decisions to request social information (Table S2). In sum,
the large diﬀerences between countries and small diﬀerences between
cities within countries indicate a systematic eﬀect of societal back-
ground in the importance of social information in decision making.
In the social dilemma, the type of social information that people
consider diﬀers strongly between societies (Fig. 2d). While the British
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participants predominantly request information about the behavior of
their peers, Chinese participants base their decisions much more fre-
quently on the payoﬀs associated with their peers' behavior (Table S1;
mean fractions of requests including payoﬀ information by those in-
dividuals who requested social information at least once: China 0.559,
United Kingdom 0.439; MW test: p < 0.001).
The between-country diﬀerences in orientations towards peer pay-
oﬀs or peer behavior persist in the coordination game (Fig. 2e). Chinese
participants show a considerably higher frequency of requests for peer
payoﬀs (Table S1). Again, we observe large and signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between countries and relatively small and insigniﬁcant diﬀerences
between cities within countries (Table S1).
In the best choice setting, samples from both countries show a pro-
nounced preference for observing peer payoﬀs rather than peer beha-
vior. Rates of requests for peer payoﬀs are much higher than in each of
the other (cooperative) settings (p < 0.001; Table S3), but do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly between countries (Table S1). This result is in line with
previous observations that in such ‘non-social’ settings (where in-
dividuals' payoﬀs do not depend on the choices of other group mem-
bers), people tend to use payoﬀ-based social learning (Mesoudi, 2011b;
Molleman et al., 2014). The results of the non-parametric tests reported
in Table S1 are conﬁrmed by GLMMs ﬁtted to individual requests for
peer payoﬀs (Table S3).
Within each of our samples and for each of the interaction settings,
we observe considerable individual variation in request rates, both with
respect to the reliance on social information and to orientations towards
peer payoﬀs or the majority (the gradually increasing lines in Fig. 2
reﬂect wide distributions). Such individual diﬀerences are commonly
observed in empirical studies of human social information use
(Eﬀerson, Lalive, Richerson, McElreath, & Lubell, 2008; McElreath
et al., 2005; Molleman et al., 2014; Muthukrishna, Morgan, & Henrich,
2016). In the cooperative settings of the social dilemma and the co-
ordination game, participants scoring high on ‘interdependence’ tended
to base their decisions on social information more frequently (Table
S4). We did not detect signiﬁcant correlations between any of the
questionnaire items and participants' orientations towards either the
majority or peer payoﬀs (Table S5).
The societal diﬀerences in gathering information about peers in-
dicate systematic diﬀerences in social learning strategies: hen co-
operative decisions are based on social information, British participants
mainly attend to the behavior of the majority, while Chinese partici-
pants rely more on peer payoﬀs. Contrary to our predictions, this result
suggests that collectivist values, though more prevalent among our
Chinese participants, do not promote majority-based social learning
strategies.
Fig. 2. Social information gathering in decision making across societies. (a, b, c) Lines show cumulative distributions characterizing individuals' social learning
strategies in three interaction settings in terms of request rates for social information. (d, e, f) Conditional upon requesting any social information, the fraction of
those requests including payoﬀ information (calculated as the number of peers for which a participant requested payoﬀ information divided by the total number of
consulted peers; see Methods and Table S5 for details). Colored and black thin lines reﬂect data from the United Kingdom (solid: Nottingham; dotted: Norwich) and
China (solid: Shanghai; dotted: Ningbo), respectively. Thick lines reﬂect distributions pooled by country. Means (μ) and medians (m) pooled by country are shown in
the top left corner of each panel.
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3.2. Responding to social information does not vary with societal
background
Although our Chinese and British samples diﬀer strongly in their
orientations towards the majority or peer payoﬀs, responses to gathered
information are virtually indistinguishable across samples. Fig. 3 shows
that participants from China and the United Kingdom condition their
decisions on the observed behavior in their group in very similar ways
(Fig. 3a, b, c). In the social dilemma, participants from both samples are
much more likely to continue their cooperation after observing more of
their peers cooperating as well (Fig. 3a). After defection, the frequency
of observed cooperation does not aﬀect average levels of cooperation in
either sample.
In the coordination game, in both China and the United Kingdom,
responses to the behavior of others show a strong non-linearity: parti-
cipants are disproportionately likely to match their behavior with the
majority of their group (Fig. 3b). In the best choice setting, requests for
peer behavior only are relatively scarce, and we only observe weak
eﬀects of observed frequency of peer behavior on own choices. These
observations are supported by logistic GLMMs ﬁtted to cases where
participants requested the choices of all four of their peers (Table S6).
We conducted an additional analysis based on a probability model
(McElreath et al., 2005) to examine whether responses to observed peer
behavior show signs of non-linearity – that is, whether common
behavior could be disproportionately less or more likely to be adopted
(Supplementary Analysis). For samples from both China and the United
Kingdom, this alternative approach suggests that in the coordination
game, participants are indeed disproportionately more likely to con-
form to majority behavior. This is not the case for the social dilemma
and the best choice setting.
Responses to observing relative payoﬀs of decisions that are oppo-
site to one's own are also very similar in both China and the United
Kingdom for each of the interaction settings (Fig. 3d, e, f). In both
samples, rates of switching increase in a similar fashion after partici-
pants observe that peers choosing the opposite behavior achieved
higher payoﬀs (Table S7). In cases where no social information is re-
quested, behavioral responses to individual payoﬀs (i.e., individual
learning) also tend to be very similar in both countries (Table S8).
Overall, in the social dilemma, individuals with higher request rates
for peer payoﬀs tend to cooperate less (linear model ﬁtted to in-
dividuals' cooperation rates in the social dilemma for all participants:
p=0.003), supporting the claim that focusing on the success of others
tends to induce selﬁsh behavior (Burton-Chellew et al., 2015, 2017; van
den Berg et al., 2015). In this setting, individuals' performance (ag-
gregate payoﬀs) was not predicted by social learning strategies (re-
liance on social information or orientation towards either the majority
or peer payoﬀs); neither did we observe any systematic diﬀerences in
performance between China and the United Kingdom (see S3, S4 and S5
Fig. 3. Responding to social information. (a, b, c) Rates of choosing A as a function of observed peer behavior. We only include cases where participants requested
information about the behavior of four of their peers. For the social dilemma, coordination game, and the best choice setting, these cases respectively comprise 46%,
48% and 9% of the periods in which social information was requested. (d, e, f) Rates of choosing A as a function of the observed diﬀerence between own payoﬀs and
payoﬀs of others with the opposite decision. We only include cases where focal participants requested information about the decision and payoﬀs of two of their peers
(and at least one peer made the opposite decision; if two peers who made the opposite decision were observed, we used the average of the two to calculate the payoﬀ
diﬀerence with the focal participant). For the social dilemma, coordination game, and the best choice setting, these cases respectively comprise 41%, 39%, and 79%
of the periods in which social information was requested. In each of the panels, lines reﬂect logistic regressions, and symbol sizes reﬂect the number of observations
underlying each dot (n). Data are pooled by country.
L. Molleman, S. Gächter Evolution and Human Behavior 39 (2018) 547–555
552
for further details and correlations for the other settings).
4. Discussion
Our results reveal systematic societal variation in the role of social
information in cooperative interactions. In line with our expectations,
cooperation decisions in the social dilemma and the coordination game
were much more frequently based on social information in our col-
lectivist samples (China) than in our individualist samples (United
Kingdom). This was also the case for the best choice setting, supporting
ﬁndings derived from individual decision-making tasks (Mesoudi et al.,
2015). Contrary to our expectations and commonly held views (Bond &
Smith, 1996), cooperation decisions in our collectivist sample were
much less based on information about majority behavior but more on
peer payoﬀs.
We designed our experiment with the aim of measuring individuals'
basic propensities for social learning. To obtain such measures in a
highly controlled manner, we made participants interact anonymously
in computer laboratories, presenting them with stylized settings in
which they made binary decisions. Of course, our experiments are
simpliﬁcations of real-world social settings in which people cooperate
and coordinate their actions; however, these abstract setups allow us to
avoid a range of issues that would arise from using richer, more con-
textualized interactions, which might have diﬀerent confounding ef-
fects for participants from diﬀerent societal backgrounds. Our abstract
setups also enable us to observe the simple building blocks of people's
decision-making heuristics. Speciﬁcally, by tracking each individual's
requests for social information prior to making a decision, our experi-
ment allowed us to measure people's inclinations to use theoretically
relevant social learning strategies in cooperative and coordinating in-
teractions (i.e., payoﬀ-based or majority-based social learning). That
said, we feel that it would be valuable to test the robustness of our basic
results in more realistic settings outside of the laboratory.
In our experiment, participants were re-grouped after each block of
ﬁve periods. We used multiple short blocks of interactions to avoid that
social information would reduce in value as groups approached equi-
librium (e.g., ‘defection’ in the social dilemma; Fig. S3); this allowed us
to repeatedly observe people's social information use in new social
environments with a great deal of uncertainty about the actions of
others. We designed our experiment to directly assess individuals' social
learning behavior rather than full-ﬂedged group dynamics under var-
ious forms of social learning. Previous studies focusing on such dy-
namics in a social dilemma setting have indicated that groups of payoﬀ-
based social learners tend to achieve lower levels of cooperation than
groups of majority-based learners (Burton-Chellew et al., 2017; van den
Berg et al., 2015). In our experiment, individuals who focused more on
peer payoﬀs did cooperate less on average, but we did not ﬁnd any
systematic relationship between cooperation levels in groups and the
social learning strategies of their members. This is most likely due in
large part to the short time frame of group interactions (i.e., blocks of
ﬁve periods rather than 20, as in van den Berg et al. (2015)).
Our experimental design controlled how participants could gather
information about their peers and allowed them to respond to in-
formation that was largely endogenous to the experiment. Individual
payoﬀs included a stochastic component independently drawn for each
participant in each period (Section 2.5), and the social information
available to participants was generated during the course of the inter-
actions. Responses to social information (Fig. 3) in a given period were
potentially inﬂuenced by factors beyond the information presented to
participants when they made their decision, such as their experience in
previous periods or their own previous payoﬀs. Insights from regression
analyses controlling for such factors (Tables S6, S7) and modelling
exercises aimed at estimating non-linearity in responses to social in-
formation (Supplementary Analysis) would ideally be complemented by
additional, dedicated experiments providing controlled measures of
individuals' responses to the full range of possible content of social (and
individual) information in a given setting. Of particular conceptual
interest would be a direct test assessing whether and to what extent, in
the context of social dilemmas, responses to behavioral information
tend to be ‘conformist’ (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Experiments could
establish whether people are disproportionately likely to adopt majority
behavior in cooperative interactions, or whether additional mechan-
isms (such as punishment of deviant behavior or reputational concerns)
would be required to generate conformist responses and stabilize be-
tween-group diﬀerences.
Contrary to our predictions, our experiment indicated that in-
dividuals in our collectivist samples are more oriented towards peer
payoﬀs than majority behavior. One potential explanation for this un-
expected ﬁnding is that in collectivist societies, conformity is limited to
in-groups where people have established social relationships
(Yamagishi et al., 1998). Our participants did not know one another
and decided under anonymity—two features that inhibit strong in-
group perceptions. Personal reputation was not directly at stake in our
experiment, which may have reduced perceived needs to conform,
especially among our Chinese participants (Yamagishi, Hashimoto, &
Schug, 2008). Experiments under less anonymous conditions might
shed light on the role of in-group psychology in shaping social learning
strategies in general, and people's inclination to conform to majorities
in particular. The enhanced focus on peer payoﬀs in cooperative deci-
sion making might also reﬂect that social learning in our Chinese
sample was more rigid than in our U.K. sample, with many Chinese
participants applying a similar (payoﬀ-based) learning strategy in in-
dividual decision-making and in social settings, where payoﬀs depend
on the behavior of others.
Our choice of subject pools (China and the United Kingdom) aimed
to vary our variable of interest (i.e., collectivism) and our experimental
procedures attempted to minimize other potentially confounding fac-
tors. While we control for a number of such factors in our analyses
(Tables S4, S5), Chinese and British society likely diﬀer in other re-
spects that are unaccounted for in the current study but which might
inﬂuence individuals' social learning. For example, the use of social
information might vary with alternative cultural dimensions (Hofstede
et al., 2010; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995), and might be
impacted by other ecological, institutional, or historical circumstances
that shape the structure of people's day-to-day interactions (Gelfand
et al., 2011; Glowacki & Molleman, 2017; Talhelm et al., 2014). Al-
though we chose our samples from highly selective universities, with
the majority of students coming from middle-class backgrounds within
their countries, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that our results
might be inﬂuenced by systematic cross-sample variation in individual
traits that are not accounted for in our study, such as IQ, socio-demo-
graphics or personality characteristics. Moreover, our results from
student samples in two cities in a country cannot, of course, be easily
generalized and taken to be typical for a whole country. This is espe-
cially the case for countries as vast and diverse as China. The fact that
observed patterns of social learning are very similar at a local Chinese
university (Shanghai) and an overseas campus from a Western uni-
versity (Ningbo), suggests that, at least among student samples, our
results are robust. In sum, we believe that further cross-cultural com-
parisons of social learning strategies would help provide a more de-
tailed picture of what drives the population diﬀerences observed in this
study.
Regardless of its proximate causes, the observed cross-societal var-
iation has important implications for our understanding of human co-
operation and cultural evolution. First, our ﬁnding that social learning
strategies vary along the axis of individualism–collectivism provides
novel support for a recent claim that social learning is not a genetically
ﬁxed, species-universal human trait (Heyes, 2012; Mesoudi et al.,
2016). Indeed, the systematic between-population diﬀerences observed
in our study suggest that social learning strategies can get tuned to local
(societal) conditions. Second, the higher frequencies of social in-
formation use in our collectivist sample indicate increased rates of
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transmission of information between individuals. In turn, this can lead
to enhanced rates of cultural evolution, facilitating a more rapid spread
of useful knowledge through a population (Henrich, 2015; Mesoudi
et al., 2015).
Third and ﬁnally, the systematic cross-societal diﬀerences in focus
on peer payoﬀs suggest that the rules governing the transmission of
social behaviors vary substantially between populations. Theory pre-
dicts that diﬀerent individual social learning strategies lead to a dif-
ferent direction and outcome of the cultural evolution of cooperation.
To our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to empirically identify popu-
lation diﬀerences in basic propensities for social learning in the context
of cooperative interactions, with people from a collectivist society being
more strongly inclined to observe peer payoﬀs and people from an in-
dividualist society focusing more on majority behavior. Our ﬁndings
regarding these basic elements of social learning strategies raise the
question of whether groups from diﬀerent populations may vary in
their potential to bolster within-group cooperation through conformist
social learning, which is thought to be a crucial prerequisite for the
cultural evolution of large-scale cooperation (Henrich, 2004; Henrich &
Boyd, 1998). Our observation of between-population diﬀerences in
social learning strategies warrants theoretical work exploring the im-
plications of these diﬀerences for the establishment of between-group
diﬀerences and the evolution of cooperation through cultural group
selection (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2004; Lehmann et al.,
2008; Richerson et al., 2016).
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